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RECENT CASE NOTES
APPEAL AND ERROR-RAISING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE IN
CRIMINAL CASES-Appellant was charged by affidavit in two counts, was
arraigned on the first count charging arson in the first degree and entered
a plea of not guilty. Subsequently, a second count was filed. Appellant
went to trial without being arraigned or. without a plea being entered as to
the second count charging second degree arson. On trial by the court,
appellant was found guilty as charged in the second count and sentenced
for one to ten years. Motion for a new trial, was overruled, which was
assigned for error. Held, conviction affirmed. Section 2232, Burns' Ann.
St. 1929, provides that "any conviction shall not be invalidated by failure
to show an arraignment and plea or either of them, unless the record shall
show that the defendant before the trial objected to entering upon the trial
for lack of such arraignment or plea." Appellant contests the validity of
such statute if it is applicable to this case. The court, however, held "that
the constitutionality of a statute must be raised either by a motion to quash
or a motion in arrest, and not by a motion for a new trial."1
The court cites as authority therefor Ellwanger v. State,2 which was
followed in Cox v. Stat6.3 In the latter two cases the statute whose con-
stitutionality appellant sought to question was the one on which the affi-
davit or indictment was based. No motions to quash or in arrest of judg-
ment were filed, and the sole assignments of error were in overruling appel-
lant's motion for new trial. The decisions in the latter two cases are in line
with the authority.4
In general, every litigant in any judicial proceeding has the right to
raise a question as to the constitutionality of any statute that may operate
adversely to his interests; the denial of such right is in violation of due
process of law.5 Fundamentally, however, the party raising the question
must be interested in and affected adversely by the act in question before
the court will consider it.6 Further, courts will only decide constitutional
questions when they are in the record, and are manifestly necessary to a
final determination of the case.7 Thus the right to contest the constitution-
"ality of statutes is limited by rules to procedure. It is uniformly held that
the constitutionality of a statute cannot properly be raised for the first
time in a court of review, but must have been called to the attention of the
'Knapp v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, June 24, 1932, 181 N. E. 517.
'Supreme Court of Indiana, 1932, 180 N. E. 287.
9 Supreme Court of Indiana, 1932, 181 N. E. 469.
4De La Tour v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 14, 165 N. E. 753; Guetilng v. State
(1928), 199 Ind. 630, 158 N. E. 593; Moore v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 578, 159 N. E.
154; Hunt v. State (1921), 191 Ind. 406, 133 N. 13. 8; Bradley v. Onstatt (1914),
180 Ind. 687. 103 N. E. 798; State v. Beach (1897), 147 Ind. 74, 46 N. E. 145;
Alderson v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 359, 168 N. E,. 481; State v. Witnehll & Rosentha4
(1920), 147 La. 781, 86 So. 181; State v. ,Taclcson (1922), 152 La 656, 94 So. 150.
$Willoughby: United States Constitutional Law (2d Ed.), Sec. 12 (1929).
sWilloughby: United States Constitutional Law (2d), Sec. 15 (1929), and
cases cied.
T Elliott: Appellate Procedure, Sec. 32 (1892); State ex rel. Taylor v. Lord
(1896), 28 Ore. 498, 43 Pac. 471.
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trial court and the proper exception reserved to the court's rulings. 8 Even
where the proper method has been followed to raise such questions, yet the
objections to the statute must be definitely and specifically stated so as to
clearly present the question to the upper court; "a finger must be placed
upon the provisions of the constitution alleged to be violated before the
question is sufficiently raised to require notice." 9 General allegations in a
motion to quash1O or a motion to arrest" that the statute on which the
affidavit is based is unconstitutional, although the proper motions to raise
the questions, are too vague and uncertain to require the notice of the
upper court. Where a party requests a court to hold a proposition of law
applicable to his case, he may not afterwards question the validity of such
proposition in the appellate court.12 Nor will the court of review entertain
an appeal or writ of error to raise a constitutional question previously
decided.13
The above rule-that the constitutional question must be first presented
to the lower court-is subject to several limitations and exceptions. In
New York, Michigan and Illinois, the courts have established a definite
exception to relieve undue hardship on the appellant, especially in the case
of an infant, where he was poorly represented in the court below,14 or
where the error was so grave and its prejudicial character so manifest that
it cannot be overlooked.1 5 The courts will take such notice, however, only
in extreme cases, and the rule is a "matter of grace."1s Under federal
appellate procedure in the second circuit, if the error is plain, it will be
considered though not properly raised.I7 Obviously, also, if the statute in
2Lindsay v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 333, 145 N. E. 438; People v. Raport (1920).
93 App. Div. 135, 183 N. Y. S. 589; Volderauer v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 415, 143
N. E. 674, where court considered the validity of a statute when the question was
presented by an assignment of error in overruling appellant's motion to quash,
refusing to consider an independent assignment of error that the affidavit was based
on an unconstitutional statute. Public Utilities Co. v. Reader, Adm'x. (1919), 71
Ind. App. 485, 122 N. B. 26; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. By. Co. V. Town of Wolcott
(1904), 162 Ind. 399, 69 N. E. 451; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. By. Co. ,'. Collins
(1907), 168 Ind. 467, 89 N. E. 415; Standish v. Bridgewater (1902), 159 Ind. 386,
65 N. E. 189; Chism v. State (1932), - Ind. -, 179 N. E. 718; McNeil & Higgans
Co. v. Neenah Cheese & Cold Storage Co. (1919), 290 Ill. 449, 125 N. E. 251, 14 Ill.
L. Rev. 666 (1920); Griveau v. So. Chicago City Ry. Co. (1905), 213 Ill. 633, 73
N. E. 309; Moses v. Royal Indemnity Co. (1916), 276 Ill. 177, 114 N. . 554; People
v. Breglin (1923), 309 111. 488, 141 N. E. 295, 18 Ill. L. Rev. 476 (1924).
*State ex rel. Franklin County v. Tibbe Electric Co. (1913), 250 Mo. 522, 157
S. NV. 635; Lohmever v. St. Louis Cordoce Co. (1908), 214 Mo. 655. 113 S. W. 1108,
and cases cited; Street v. School District of St. Joseph (1909), 221 Mo. 663, 120 S.
W. 1159; Commercial Bank v. Blesinghame (1918), 147 Ga. 636, 95 S. E. 222.
'*State v. Rosborough (1922), 152 LA. 945, 94 So. 858; State v. Richardson
(1924), - Mo. -, 267 S. W. 841.
"Armond v. State (1916), 18 Ga. App. 116, 88 S. E. 990; State v. Bonier
(1902), 107 La. 794, 32 So. 175.
13Cummings v. People (1904), 211 Ill. 392, 71 N. E. 1031.
"People v. Fensky (1919), 290 Ill. 612, 125 N. E. 292; People v. Blein (1925),
317 Ill. 639, 148 N. E. 249.
"'People v. Gardiner (1922), 303 Ill. 204, 125 N. E. 422.
'People v. Weiss (1908), 129 App. Div. 61, 114 N. Y. S. 236; People v. Brott
(1910), 163 Mich. 150, 128 N. W. 236. See also 40 Hare. L. Rev. 999 (1927).
1136 Hary. L. Rev. 103 (1923); People v. Brott (1910), 163 Mich. 159, 128
N. W. 236.
17 Oppenheim, v. United States (1917), 241 Fed. 625; Zoline: Federal Appellate
Jurisdiction and Procedure (3d Ed.) Sea. 107, and cases cited. See also Schoart, v.
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question is necessary to the jurisdiction of either the reviewer or trial court,
the question will be considered though not raised below.1s Also, in the
rather unusual instance where the constitutionality of the same statute
was before the same court in another case at the same time, the court
considered the question, though not properly presented.19
The courts' regulation of the right to contest the validity of statutes
having been firmly established, the theory of the rule in the Cox case, that
the constitutionality of the statute upon which the affidavit is based is not
raised on motion for new trial, is this: The motion for new trial sets out
certain grounds (See Burns' Ann. St. 1926, sec. 2323), one being that the
verdict is contrary to law. "This phrase, as used in the statute, we interpret
as meaning contrary to the principles of law as applied to the facts or
issues which the jury were called upon to try. * * * At most, it cannot
be extended to include matters not proper to be considered in support of the
motion for a new trial, nor to embrace any of the other distinct and sepa-
rate grounds of the motion which are specified in the act."2 0 The consti-
tutionality of the statute is not contrary to the "principles of law as applied
to the facts, etc.," but is outside the trial proper and is a question as to the
sufficiency of the affidavit, that is, that it does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a public offense. Thus, being a question of pleading and not in
the trial proper, it should not be presented in a motion for a new trial,
since it would not be rectified by the granting thereof.21 It is perfectly
obvious that if the only error were that the statute was unconstitutional,
a new trial based on the same affidavit would not change the result nor
bring about justice. The decisions are all in accord. Rulings on a plea in
abatement, 22 or on a motion to quash23 being no part of the trial on the
merits, may not be presented by alleging such ruling as error in a motion
for new trial. Only those errors committed in the trial itself may be pre-
sented" on motion for new trial. Thus rulings on pleadings before arraign-
ment, though erroneous, are not challenged by a motion for a new trial.24
The rule that the validity of the statute on which the affidavit is based
must be raised by a motion to quash or motion in arrest is entirely logical
and supported by good reason. The sole question raised is as to the suffi-
ciency of the affidavit, since if the statute is unconstitutional the affidavit
does not state facts constituting a public offense. However, one is not
relieved from such charge without assailing the statute by some recognized
method. And the proper method of testing the sufficiency of the affidavit
is not by a motion for new trial, but by a motion to quash,2 5 or by a motion
People (1909), 46 Colo. 239, 104 Pac. 92. where court considered question not
raised below when it clearly appeared on the face of the record to be involved.
'$State ex rel. Vandiver v. Burke (1912), 175 Ala. 561, 57 So. 870. Applying
the same principles to criminal cases, Griggs v. State (1908), 130 Ga. 15, 60 S. E.
103; Cosper v. State (1913), - Ga. -, 79 S. E. 94.
"Van Pelt v. Hilliard (1918), 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693.2 0 BZlwanger v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, 1932, 180 N. D. 287.
"Elliott: Appellate Procedure, Sec. 350 (1892).
1Moore v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 578, 159 N. E. 154.
IsNafe v. Leiter (1885), 103 Ind. 138, 2 N. B. 317; Utley v. State (1924), 194
Ind. 186, 142 N. El. 377.
2AHunt v. State (1921), 191 Ind. 406, 133 N. E. 8.
2Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926, See. 2227. State v. Beach (1897), 147 Ind. 74, 46
N. E. 145; 'errell v. State (1905), 165 Ind. 443, 75 N. E. 884; Scott v. State (1911),
176 Ind. 382, 96 N. E. 125.
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in arrest of judgment.2s Further, it is an elementary principle that where
precise grounds for review have been prescribed, appellant must show that
he has complied strictly with such rules. The rule in the Cox case has not
only been stated by the courts, but has been applied by them in practice. 2 7
Having arrived at the conclusion that the rule set out in the Cox and
Ellwanger cases is sound and well supported by authority, the next ques-
tion that is presented is whether or not the rule should have been applied
in the Knapp case. There is considerable doubt in the mind of the writer
as to the propriety of so doing. In that case the statute whose validity was
doubted was not the one on which the affidavit was based, but was one
applicable to arraignment and the entering of pleas providing a waiver of
the right to arraignment and pleading by entering upon the trial without
objection. The court laid down our rule that such statute should have been
questioned not by motion for new trial, as appellant sought, but by motion
to quash or motion in arrest. But could appellant have raised the question
by either of the latter two motions? By Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926, Sec. 2227,
defendant may move to quash when it appears on the face of the affidavit
that the grand jury had no legal authority, and the facts stated do not
constitute a public offense, that the affidavit contains any matter consti-
tuting a legal bar to the prosecution, or that the offense is not stated with
sufficient certainty. Merely the jurisdiction of the grand jury or the suffi-
ciency of the affidavit is questioned by such motion, and it has been held
that since the statute specifies the grounds available for a motion to quash,
nothing outside of the grounds specified is available.28 The statute in
question here does not seem to come within the grounds specified in See.
2227, since it applies neither to the authority of the grand jury nor to
the sufficiency of the affidavit. If the court will continue to construe
Sec. 2227 that nothing outside the grounds specified may be considered,
and that it questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, how may such motion
to quash raise the question as to the constitutionality of a statute which
is not connected with the affidavit, whose application in time occurs after
the affidavit has been filed, and opportunity to questioh it has been given,
and which is not set out in the grounds for a motion to quash?
By Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926, Sec. 2326, the grounds for a motion in
arrest of judgment are that the grand jury had no legal authority to in-
quire into the offense charged since such offense was not within the
jurisdiction of the court, and that the facts stated in the indictment or
affidavit do not constitute a public offense. It has been held that a motion
in arrest of judgment can only be made for want of jurisdiction and in-
sufficiency of the affidavit.29 Although a motion in arrest and a motion to
1Burns Ann. Stat. 1926, See. 2326; Hoover v. State (1886), 110 Ind. 349, 11
N. E. 434; Woodsanall v. State (1913), 179 Ind. 382, 96 N. E. 125.
2TMoUons to Quash-Volderauer v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 415, 143 N. E. 674;
Eirer v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 562, 149 N. E. 62. Motion in arrest-Lindsay v.
State (1924), 195 Ind. 333, 145 N. E. 438; State v. Wittehill & Rosenthal (1920),
147 La. 781, 86 So. 181.
NState v. Jackson (1918), 187 Ind. 694, 121 N. E. 114; Ratzen v. State (1922),
192 Ind. 476, 137 N. E. 29.
Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. State (1912), 178 Ind. 498, 99 N. E. 801;
Lay v. State (1913), 180 Ind. 1, 102 N. E. 294; Bass v. State (1919), 188 Ind. 21,
120 N. E. 667; Rowe v. State (1922), 191 Ind. 526, 133 N. E. 2.
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quash are not the same thing,3o for the purpose of this discussion they
may be treated alike. Since the motion in arrest tests only the authority
of the grand jury or the sufficiency of the affidavit, like the motion to
quash, how then can it, any more than the motion to quash, raise a ques-
tion as to the constitutionality of the statute sought to be questioned in
the Knapp case? If the court is correct in holding that appellant may not
contest the statute by motion for new trial, it would seem that he is pre-
vented from raising the question at all.
Under Sec. 2325, Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926, the court is empowered to
grant a new trial for "irregularities in 'the proceedings of the court or
jury, or for any order of the court, or abuse of discretion, by which the
defendant was prevented from having a fair trial." Prior to the enactment
of Sec. 2232, Burns' Ann. Stat 1929, the statute in question, it was held
under this section (2325) that failure to arraign the defendant and have
him plead is cause for a new trial.3 1 Of course, if Sec. 2232 is constitu-
tional, then such failure is no longer cause for a new trial. But appellant
still has his right to question the constitutionality of the statute3 2 so long as
it has not already been held constitutional, 33 and it would seem such ques-
tion should be raised under Sec. 2325, supra, since if the statute is uncon-
stitutional, appellant would be entitled to a new trial under previous
decisions of the court.3 4 Unless he is to be denied altogether the right to
question the validity of the statute, which denial would be in violation of
due process clause of the Constitution, it must be under a motion for a
new trial.
There is no doubt but that a constitutional question may be raised dur-
ing the trial which must be considered on motion for a new trial, and
could not be raised by a motion in arrest or a motion to quash. In Lohmeyer
v. St. Louis Cordage Co.,35 although affirming the general rule that the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity on the
pleadings as by a motion to quash, the court stated that a constitutional
question might be raised during the trial regardless of the pleadings
through some unanticipated ruling on admission of evidence, where the trial
court had the opportunity to correct the error on motion for new trial,
or by a clause in the motion for new trial, when it did not appear else-
where on the record, as in an instruction involving the Constitution, as
permitting nine jurors out of twelve to return the verdict.3 6 It is con-
ceivable that other constitutional questions might be raised during the trial
itself incapable of being raised by a motion to quash or a motion in arrest,
such as a statute regulating searches and seizures and admissions of evi-
dence obtained thereby which might be contested as violating the constitu-
tional guarantee -of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, or
statutes destroying or limiting certain privileges guaranteed by the con-
stitution, as the privilege against self-incrimination.
"Booe v. State (1914), 181 Ind. 562, 106 N. E. 117; Bass . State (1910), 188
Ind. 21, 120 N. E. 657.
$Prtchard v. State (1920), 190 Ind. 49, 127 N. E. 545.
"Willoughby: United States Constitutional Law (2d ed.), Sec. 12 (1929).
sPeople v. Pensky (1919), 290 Ill. 612, 125 N. E. 292; People v. Blesz (1925),
317 1u. 639, 148 N. E. 249.
NPritchard v. State (1920), 190 Ind. 49. 127 N. M. 545.
- (1908) 214 Mo. 685, 113 S. W. 1108.
"Logan v. Feld (1905), 192 Mo. 66, 90 S. W. 127.
RECENT CASE NOTES
It is submitted that the doctrine of the Cox case seems to have been
extended beyond its logical and reasonable limits in applying it to the
Knapp case; the rule, though proper, should be limited. However, even
though the holding of the court in the latter case refusing to consider the
statute of waiver of arraignment and pleading should prove to be an
erroneous application of the rule, nevertheless, under the facts in that case,
and considering the statute involved, there was no substantial or prejudicial
error to the rights of the appellant. In the first place, appellant in his
motion for new trial did not assign as grounds therefor "irregularities in
the proceedings of the court and jury * * " as provided in Sec. 2325,
(1). Further, there should be no question as to the constitutionality of
Sec. 2232, supra, since such regulation of procedure has always been held to
be due process of law, and further, by entering upon trial without objection,
presenting a defense, and following through the entire trial, the defendant
should be estopped from asserting that no issue had been formed by the
failure to arraign and plead, and that he was not informed of the character
of the charge against him. Although the constitutionality of the statute
has not been directly attacked, yet it has been frequently applied since its
enactment with no serious questions as to its validity.3 7 Consequently, the
same result would have been reached had the constitutionality of the statute
been considered, and under the facts in this case, at any rate, the discussion
is of a purely academic question. A failure to recognize the rule, its
reasons and limitations, might, however, under other facts, bring about a
different result, and prejudice the rights of a defendant. P. C. R.
OFFicns-ToRT LiAmirry-MINisnmLAL DuTY-Action to recover prop-
erty damages. The appellants, who were state entomologists and engaged
in the eradication of the corn borer, plowed the appellee's oat field to cover
over old cornstalks and other refuse, which the appellee had failed to dis-
pose of when so ordered. The plowing was done at a time when the soil
was over saturated with moisture, and the crop of oats were eight inches in
height, causing injury to the fertility of the soil and destroying the crop
of oats. There was no evidence of any traces of the corn borer in the ap-
pellee's field, or within the immediate vicinity. The jury found the plowing
unwarranted and unreasonable, and held the appellants liable for the dam-
age. The appellants contend that as officers of the state, acting under
authority from the conservation department, they are not personally liable
for injuries sustained as a result of their acts. Held, public officers are
personally liable for the wrongful performance of their ministerial duties.'
The principal case presents the question as to what extent a public
office affords protection from personal liability, in the performance of min-
isterial duties. A ministerial duty is absolute, certain and imperative, in-
volving the mere execution of a designated task, the law prescribing the
mode of performance so that very little, if any, discretion remains in the
officer. 2 Duties and acts which the courts have held to be ministerial are:
dipping for the eradication of the cattle tick;3 levying of a tax by a board
sTokas v. State (1930), 202 Ind. 259, 173 N. E. 453; Lee v. State (1929), 90
Ind. App. 43, 167 N. E. 543.
1 Wallace v. Feehan, Appellate Court of Indiana, June 3, 1932, 181 N. E. 862.
2Roberta v. United States (1899), 176 U. S. 221, 20 Sup. Ct. 376.
aMclellan v. Carter (1923), 30 Ga. App. 150, 117 S. E. 118.
